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Abstract 
 
This article considers the potential for insurer competition to improve health system 
performance by strengthening purchasing. Economic theory suggests that insurer 
competition will enhance efficiency if: (1) people have free choice of insurer, (2) 
competition is based on price and quality rather than risk selection and (3) insurers 
have tools to influence health care costs and quality. The article assesses the extent to 
which these assumptions hold in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
It finds that health insurance market reforms in these countries have had mixed results 
in fulfilling these assumptions. In spite of significant investment in risk equalisation, 
incentives for risk selection remain. Consumer mobility is lower among older and 
chronically ill people, possibly due to close interaction between statutory and voluntary 
coverage. Although insurers in some countries increasingly have tools to enhance 
value, they may not always use them. The analysis suggests that the instrumental value 
of insurer competition rests on multiple assumptions that can only be upheld through 
frequently complex interventions often requiring elusive data. Making it work therefore 
requires action on several fronts, particularly to ensure incentives are aligned across the 
health system, and awareness of the political nature of some barriers to success. 
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The rationale for competition among statutory health insurers 
Choice of and competition among insurers offering statutory (mandatory) health 
coverage has become more prominent in Europe in the last 15 years and is now an 
integral feature of health financing policy in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Switzerland and Slovakia (1, 2). 
Although this form of competition is not widespread in practice, the idea that third-
party payers should compete for publicly financed clients is debated in countries as 
diverse as England and Estonia (3, 4). 
 
In theory, competition between insurers is intended to enhance allocative and 
productive efficiency in health care administration and delivery through two 
mechanisms: making insurers bear financial risk and giving people free choice of 
insurer (5). Having a fixed and prospectively determined budget within which to meet 
enrolee health care costs may encourage insurers to use resources judiciously; if they 
cannot stay within budget they will have to charge higher premiums and risk losing 
enrolees. The threat of consumer exit may also encourage insurers to be more 
responsive to public preferences; if people are sensitive to price and quality, insurers 
will try to maintain or improve quality while minimising costs using a range of tools, 
including cutting overheads and engaging in more ‘strategic’ purchasing of health 
services (6). At least three other conditions must be met for insurer competition to 
achieve efficiency objectives1. First, people should be able to choose and switch insurer 
with ease and without incurring significant transaction costs. This implies that 
individuals are able to make an informed choice of insurer and do not face barriers to 
switching. Second, insurer competition should be based on price and quality, rather 
than risk selection (7). Third, insurers should have access to tools that allow them to 
influence health care quality and costs, and be willing to use them. 
 
In practice, European countries have introduced choice of insurer in response to a range 
of problems with existing statutory health insurance arrangements. Some countries 
have explicitly pursued efficiency goals. Others have been driven more by concerns for 
equity, access and expenditure control. Even where efficiency has not been a stated or 
primary rationale, however, those in favour of insurer choice may have expected 
competition to result in efficiency gains and, ultimately, to improve health system 
performance. In addition to differences in goals, there are also differences in key 
aspects of health insurance market reform in European health systems – for example, 
Dutch insurers have access to many more efficiency-enhancing tools than do their 
counterparts in other countries (see below). This cross-national variation in goals and in 
implementation prompts three observations. First, differences in implementation may 
be linked to differences in goals. Second, there is little evidence to suggest that health 
insurance competition has had the desired effect on efficiency, even where efficiency 
has been an explicit goal (8). For example, recent evaluations of the 2006 health 
insurance market reform in the Netherlands report mixed results: waiting times for 
                                                 
1 Bevan and van de Ven (2010) have set out a larger number of conditions that must be fulfilled if insurer 
competition is to achieve its goals. We have condensed some of these conditions so that they fall under 
the three conditions listed here. We also take some of the conditions in Bevan and van de Ven’s list, such 
as regulation, as a given since (for example) universal freedom to switch could probably only be 
achieved through regulation.  
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inpatient treatment and pharmaceutical prices have fallen (9), but so far only some 
aspects of health insurer performance have improved (the transparency of user charges 
requirements and health plan information) (10). Third, expectations about efficiency 
gains may conflict with other stated objectives such as expenditure caps or expenditure 
control. 
 
This paper explores differences in the goals and implementation of statutory health 
insurance competition in Europe. To do so it compares the experience of four western 
European countries (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland), focusing on 
these countries because of their similar health system characteristics and economic and 
political context. The paper’s analysis is structured as follows. The next section 
outlines the policy goals underpinning statutory health insurance reforms in each 
country. Subsequent sections review the implementation and development of policies to 
ensure consumer mobility, remove incentives for risk selection and give insurers tools 
to enhance efficiency. A further section discusses implications for policy. 
 
The paper adds to the literature by applying a uniform set of criteria to enable a 
systematic comparison of choice and competition in statutory health insurance across 
the four countries and by providing a comprehensive and up to date cross-national 
overview of health insurance coverage, regulation and market structure. Because a 
comparison of four countries cannot hope to explore the complexities of reform 
implementation in great depth, detailed analysis of the policy context in each country is 
beyond the scope of the paper. An evaluation of the outcomes of insurer competition is 
also beyond the paper’s scope; robust evaluation poses challenges due to lack of data, 
noise from other reforms and absence of knowledge about the counterfactual, and 
comparative evaluation is further complicated by cross-national differences in goals 
and implementation. Finally, the paper does not aim to test the validity of the three 
conditions (that is, the extent to which they are necessary for insurer competition to 
‘work’); rather, it uses the conditions to structure discussion about differences across 
countries and to highlight areas requiring policy attention. 
 
Policy history, development and goals 
 
This section outlines the history and development of policies to facilitate insurer choice 
and competition in the four countries in chronological order. It reviews the policy goals 
underpinning more recent reforms. Awareness of the goals specific to each country, 
and the context in which they have been formulated, is important for the analysis of 
implementation and discussion of policy implications in subsequent sections. Table 1, 
Table 2 and Table 3 depict key features of current health insurance coverage, regulation 
and market structure. 
 
Tables 1-3 here 
 
Switzerland 
Choice of health insurer in Switzerland dates to 1911, when the first federal law on 
Sickness and Accident Insurance came into force. At that time the health insurance 
system was mainly managed by small-scale, private, non-profit institutions. State 
subsidies were required to encourage people to enrol from an early age and to make 
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premiums more affordable. In order to qualify for subsidies, insurers had to offer open 
enrolment to people under the age of 55 and portable benefits. They also had to limit 
the difference between premiums for men and women to 25%. By 1945, about half of 
the population was covered, expanding to near-universal coverage between 1985 and 
1990. 
 
Under the 1911 legislation, switching was not easy or costless for everyone. Weak 
regulation, premiums based on age at enrolment, and the entry of new insurers led to a 
degree of unfair competition based on risk selection. During the early 1990s, many 
sickness funds collapsed or merged with others to avoid bankruptcy. Concerns about 
unequal access to health insurance, combined with concerns about solidarity, rising 
health expenditure and gaps in coverage, gave rise to a new Federal Health Insurance 
Act (FHIA) in 1996. To address access concerns and to encourage fair competition 
based on price and quality, the new law made health insurance universally compulsory, 
extended open enrolment and introduced a standard benefits package, risk equalisation 
and minimum user charges. The law maintained collective contracting of providers, but 
to enhance efficiency by encouraging better purchasing, it gave insurers leeway to 
develop and sell so-called managed-care plans to those willing to accept limited choice 
of provider in return for lower premiums. Managed-care plans can involve referral to 
specialists, selective contracting and capitation-based provider payment. The Swiss 
reform therefore aimed to enhance equity of access to health care, to strengthen 
solidarity and, at the same time, to create incentives for organizational innovation and 
expenditure control (11). 
 
Belgium 
Compulsory health insurance for employees was established in Belgium in 1944 and is 
currently managed by five non-governmental, non-profit sickness fund associations 
comprising 54 local sickness funds, a special fund for railroad employees and a public 
insurer of last resort (12). In 1964 the government extended compulsory coverage of 
inpatient care to self-employed people and in 2008 coverage for the self-employed was 
further extended to include outpatient care. 
 
Although Belgian residents have enjoyed free choice of sickness fund since 1944, this 
choice has not been regarded as a means of stimulating insurer competition. Rather, 
funds were associated with different political or religious groups and choice simply 
allowed people to express their preference for a ‘Christian’ or ‘Socialist’ insurer. In 
1995 the government introduced partial prospective funding of sickness funds, 
accompanied by risk equalisation, to make them take on some financial risk. Even so, 
the underlying policy intention was not to foster competition among sickness funds but 
to place them on an equal footing and encourage them to contain health care costs (13). 
The sickness funds were not given new tools, such as selective contracting, with which 
to influence health service quality and costs (14). 
 
Belgium is the only one of the four countries to have a public insurer of last resort. 
Unlike the sickness funds, the public fund has no historical affiliation to political or 
religious groups, nor does it offer compulsory additional benefits2 (as the local sickness 
                                                 
2 Compulsory additional benefits refer to items not included in the statutory benefits package, which does 
not vary across insurers. Additional benefits are offered at the discretion of individual insurers (and 
might include things like orthodontics, alternative medicine or home care services); they must be 
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funds do). As a result, its small share of the market (1%) is made up of people who do 
not wish to pay for additional benefits or who prefer a ‘neutral’ fund.  
 
The Netherlands 
In 1991 the Dutch government introduced free choice of non-profit sickness fund for 
the two-thirds of the population eligible for statutory health care coverage and sickness 
funds began to take on financial risk for their enrolees’ health care costs. Free choice of 
fund was intended to improve efficiency and responsiveness to consumer preferences. 
By the end of 2005, the sickness funds bore financial risk for 53% of their revenue. 
However, there was growing dissatisfaction among policy makers with the absence of 
other incentives for efficiency and innovation within the prevailing regulatory 
framework, coupled with concerns about long waiting times for specialist care. The 
increasingly heavy regulation required to ensure access to voluntary health insurance 
(VHI) for the third of the population excluded from statutory health care coverage3 was 
also seen as unsatisfactory. 
 
The 2006 Health Insurance Act extended statutory coverage to the whole population 
under a new system managed by private insurers (some of whom were formerly 
sickness funds; others had been active in the market for VHI). Insurers now have 
stronger incentives to be prudent purchasers of health services, including increased 
financial risk (92% of revenue) and some tools to stimulate competition among 
providers. It was expected that over time consumer choice of insurer would reduce the 
emphasis on government regulation of health care supply and increase the use of 
strategic purchasing to enhance efficiency. This in turn would make health care more 
affordable, more responsive to patient needs and more effective, bringing about a better 
balance between costs and benefits (8). 
 
Germany 
Historically, statutory health insurance (SHI) in Germany was compulsory for all blue-
collar employees and for white-collar employees with earnings below a threshold. 
Employees were assigned to a non-profit, quasi-public sickness fund based on 
geographical or occupational criteria. Only white-collar employees with earnings above 
the threshold were allowed to choose between voluntary enrolment in the SHI system, 
buying substitutive VHI from private insurers or not being covered at all. If they chose 
SHI, they had free choice of sickness fund and the option of switching fund at regular 
intervals (unlike other employees) (15). Assigned membership among blue-collar and 
lower-earning white collar employees led to large variation in income-related 
contribution rates – of up to 8 percentage points in the early 1990s – because sickness 
funds covered people with very different income levels and risk profiles (16). Over 
time, variation in contribution rates and differences in the rights of white- and blue-
                                                                                                                                              
purchased by all those who enroll with a particular insurer. The local sickness funds have traditionally 
offered a mixture of compulsory additional benefits and voluntary supplementary and complementary 
health insurance. In 2010 a change in the law separated compulsory and voluntary activity. From 2012 
voluntary additional benefits have been sold by new non-profit societies of mutual assistance, which are 
part of the national sickness fund associations. 
3 Before 2006, people with incomes above a certain level, and their dependants – around one third of the 
population in total – were not eligible for statutory coverage of health care costs. These individuals relied 
on voluntary health insurance sold by competing private insurers. 
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collar employees came to be regarded as inequitable, particularly since blue-collar 
employees often experienced higher contribution rates than white-collar employees. 
 
In 1992 the German legislature extended free choice of sickness fund to almost all 
those covered by SHI, with effect from 1996. This was primarily intended to tackle 
equity concerns about varying contribution rates by permitting anyone to choose a 
sickness fund with a lower contribution rate. It was expected that free choice would 
lead to a convergence in contribution rates. Since the national and international 
ideological climate at that time favoured the introduction of market mechanisms in 
health care, it was also hoped that fostering competition within the SHI system would 
control health care costs and increase efficiency. Free choice of sickness fund was 
preceded by the introduction (in 1994–1995) of risk equalisation to prevent risk 
selection and ensure contribution rates would signal a sickness fund’s ability to operate 
efficiently. It was clear from its inception that the risk-adjustment formula was crude, 
but the government did not have the tools and data necessary to implement a more 
sophisticated scheme. Because the sickness funds bore significant financial risk, any 
risk adjustment was seen as better than none. 
 
The change in legislation made health insurance compulsory for all permanent residents 
in 2009. SHI covers employees (with the exception of civil servants) and their 
dependants (non-earning spouses and children), the unemployed, pensioners, students, 
farmers and (since 2007) anyone not covered by substitutive VHI. Employees whose 
gross wages exceed €50,850 a year (in 2012) – less than 15% of the population – can 
choose between statutory and private cover, but they must have some form of 
insurance. Less than a third of this high-earning group opts for private cover. SHI 
covers about 85% of the population, private VHI covers around 10% (more than half of 
whom are civil servants and the self-employed) and government schemes cover about 
4%.  
 
Consumer mobility 
 
For insurers, the threat of exit may be muted if people cannot move (switch) freely 
from one insurer to another, undermining a major pre-requisite for insurer competition. 
In the absence of a single metric to establish the degree of consumer mobility in 
insurance markets (there is no optimal rate of switching), a range of factors needs to be 
considered. These include financial and administrative barriers to joining a new insurer, 
the reasons people give for switching or staying put and the characteristics of those 
who do and do not switch. If non-switchers are mainly people with predictably high 
health care costs – a situation termed ‘adverse retention’ (17) – the instrumental effect 
of exit might be severely weakened or even eliminated, particularly if risk adjustment 
(see below) is absent or of poor quality. Insurers who assume that these enrolees have 
no real alternative may not have much incentive to respond to their preferences (18) 
and might attempt to erode service quality or encourage them to switch. 
 
Strategies to facilitate switching 
All four countries employ multiple strategies to ensure that the whole population is able 
to switch from one insurer to another, for statutory benefits, with relative ease and at 
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low cost: open enrolment,4 coverage of pre-existing conditions, premiums that are not 
linked to individual risk of ill health, fully portable benefits, a standardised benefits 
package to enable straightforward price comparisons, good comparative information 
available through newspapers, web sites5 and intermediaries, and risk adjustment to 
compensate insurers for covering high-risk individuals. These universally applied 
strategies mean that the financial and administrative costs of switching are likely to be 
low. Other transaction costs may be high, however, as we discuss below. 
 
Switcher characteristics 
Switching rates vary across the four countries, with the lowest rates in Belgium and the 
highest rates in Switzerland (Table 4). People who switch are more likely to be younger 
in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland (no data are available for Belgium) and 
are more likely to be healthier in Germany and the Netherlands. In Switzerland people 
who switch are more likely to be healthier if they have VHI (reporting their health to be 
‘very good’ rather than ‘good’ or ‘poor’). 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Reasons for switching and for staying put 
Reasons for switching differ in importance across the four countries, with price playing 
no role in Belgium and a significant role in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany. 
Consumer perceptions of differences in quality seem to play some role in all four 
countries (Table 5). The Netherlands and Switzerland have the largest differences in 
price across insurers. In the Netherlands the gap between the cheapest and most 
expensive community-rated premiums is not as large as in Switzerland and has 
narrowed since 2006, while the average community-rated premium remains below the 
break-even threshold calculated by the Ministry of Health in 2006 (8). 
 
Table 5 here 
 
In contrast, premiums have grown rapidly in Switzerland in recent years, prompting the 
much higher than usual rates of switching seen in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 (Table 4), 
and premium variation is substantial. By selecting the highest deductible and enrolling 
in a managed-care network, policy holders in Switzerland can lower their premiums by 
up to 50%; in Zurich canton, for example, 5% of people paid an annual premium of less 
than CHF 3,500 (€2,895) in 2010, while 5% paid over CHF 4,900 (€4,053), a 
difference of more than CHF 1,400 (€1,158) (19). Unlike the Netherlands, there is no 
evidence of premium variation within cantons narrowing over time (20), which may be 
an indication of insufficient consumer mobility. 
 
In Germany in 2010 only 13 of the (then) more than 150 sickness funds charged 
additional community-rated premiums and these are low in comparison to the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. Nevertheless, people appear to be very sensitive to price. 
In the first half of 2010 sickness funds that introduced an additional community-rated 
premium of €8 per month in February of that year lost up to 20% of their enrolees (21). 
                                                 
4 In Belgium since 2007 only, replacing a system of guaranteed renewal of contract. 
5 Government-sponsored web sites in the Netherlands (www.kiesbeter.nl) and (since 2012) in 
Switzerland (www.priminfo.ch) and private initiatives in all four countries. 
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In 2011 the cap on additional premiums was lifted, which may intensify price 
competition in future. 
 
Survey data from the Netherlands and Switzerland suggest many people feel no need to 
switch because they are satisfied with their current insurer (45% in the Netherlands and 
79% in Switzerland) (22, 23). There is also evidence of people preferring to maintain 
the status quo (24) or using subjective measures of quality to determine insurer choice. 
Forty per cent of people surveyed in Switzerland chose an insurer based on parents’ 
and friends’ choices and ‘tradition’, while 13.5% said they stayed with their insurer out 
of habit; those who had been with an insurer for longer were less likely to express an 
intention to switch (23). About 25% said they did not try to choose the insurer with the 
lowest premiums. Prior to the 2006 reform in the Netherlands, the most frequently 
mentioned reason for being enrolled with a particular insurer was having joined the 
fund in early adulthood (25), a status quo bias that was perhaps reinforced by the 
relatively small difference between insurers at that time. In spite of the growth in 
premium and product differentiation since then, the proportion of Dutch respondents 
who believe they do not stand to benefit much by switching has risen from 68% in 
2006 to 74% in 2008 and 18% said it was too much trouble to switch (22). In 2009 7% 
said they did not switch because they felt they would not be able to obtain a new VHI 
policy if they changed to a new insurer for statutory cover, up from 4% in 2006 (26). 
 
Barriers to consumer mobility 
Research indicates that many people in the four countries have legitimate reasons (from 
a policy perspective) for not switching. However, the links between age, health and 
switching in Germany and the Netherlands, and between age, health, VHI and 
switching in Switzerland suggest that older and less healthy people may face barriers to 
switching. In the following paragraphs we discuss three reasons why this might be the 
case. 
 
First, evidence from research in the United States shows that switching costs tend to be 
higher for older and less healthy people (27), who risk having to change provider, 
having to interrupt current treatment and losing valuable knowledge about how things 
work with their current insurer (27, 28). In general, switching costs are probably much 
lower in the European countries than in the United States, although they are far from 
absent, as the 18% of Dutch people reporting it was too much trouble to switch 
demonstrates (22). However, if selective contracting becomes more common in these 
European health systems (see below), the costs of switching could grow. Selective 
contracting is intended to enhance productive efficiency, but it has the potential to 
undermine continuity of care and equity of access to services (29). 
 
Second, the availability of complementary or supplementary VHI may reduce 
consumer mobility among older and less healthy people if sales of voluntary and 
statutory cover are linked, creating a lock-in effect (30, 31). In Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland VHI is sold by entities belonging to the same sickness 
funds that provide statutory cover (Table 3). Until recently, Belgian households were 
required to purchase voluntary and statutory cover from the same entity and VHI was 
the main way in which insurers differentiated themselves. Legislation in Switzerland 
explicitly prevents insurers from linking the sale of voluntary and statutory cover (20, 
26), but there are close ties between them; 93% of those with voluntary policies 
(purchased by 75% of the population) obtain both types of cover from the same insurer, 
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partly because reimbursement is much simpler when it comes from one company (20). 
In the Netherlands VHI covers about 90% of the population and most people buy 
voluntary and statutory cover from the same insurer (8). Although the termination of 
voluntary contracts when enrolees switch to another insurer for statutory cover is 
prohibited by law, insurers frequently breach the law (26)6. Dutch insurers can raise 
VHI premiums when people switch for statutory cover (and many do) and there are 
other ways in which they can link the sale of voluntary and statutory cover7. In 2009 
97% of insurers adopted at least one linking strategy, a much higher proportion than in 
2006 (at least 44% of insurers) (26). 
 
There is no clear evidence of insurers using VHI to select risks in the statutory market 
in any of the four countries (20, 26, 31). Nevertheless, consumer beliefs about risk 
selection by insurers in the VHI market seem to be a powerful barrier to switching in 
the statutory market for less healthy people. In Switzerland switching was found to be 
less likely among people with VHI whose self-reported health was less than ‘very 
good’. In the Netherlands the proportion of non-switching survey respondents who said 
they did not switch because they believed they would not be able to obtain a new 
voluntary policy at all due to their age or health status (that is, they believed insurers 
would reject their application for voluntary cover) rose from 4% in 2006 to 7% in 2009 
(26). The proportion of respondents who gave this as the most important reason for not 
switching rose from 1.5% in 2006 to 3.4% in 2009. Similar figures applied to 
respondents who did not switch but seriously considered doing so. 
 
Third, choice ‘overload’ may reduce consumer mobility by lowering transparency, 
which increases the transaction costs of switching (32, 33). Swiss research shows how 
the probability of switching is significantly lower in areas with larger numbers of 
insurers, even where premium variation is significant (23). Furthermore, among survey 
respondents who were very dissatisfied with their current insurer, 34% intended to 
switch in areas with fewer than 50 statutory health insurers versus 22% in areas with 
more than 50 insurers. Growing product differentiation can also contribute to choice 
overload. With the exception of Belgium, insurers have many more ways now than in 
the past of modifying the standard statutory product: they can offer choice of cash or 
in-kind benefits, higher deductibles in return for lower premiums or contributions, no-
claims bonuses and reduced user charges for accepting gatekeeping, disease 
management or use of preferred providers (Table 6). These options may benefit some 
individuals but there is likely to be a trade-off in terms of transparency and ease of 
price comparison (34, 35). They may also restrict choice in other areas. In Germany 
people who opt for a contract involving gatekeeping, integrated care or cost 
reimbursement lose the right to switch for a three-year period. In Switzerland 
parliament had proposed to offer people choosing managed care the option of a three 
year contract (instead of an annual one), but the proposal was rejected in a referendum 
held in 2012. 
                                                 
6 Recent research found that, when queried, the customer services representatives of half of all insurers in 
the Netherlands specified that a voluntary contract would be terminated if the enrolee switched to another 
insurer for statutory cover (26). 
7 Only offering voluntary contracts in combination with statutory cover; charging higher premiums when 
people apply for voluntary cover alone; applying more stringent acceptance criteria when people want 
only voluntary cover; and offering free voluntary cover for children if parents and children obtain 
statutory cover from the same insurer (26). 
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Table 6 here 
 
Incentives for risk selection  
 
Insurer competition should be based on price and quality rather than on risk selection 
(encouraging enrolment among people with lower-than-average risk and discouraging 
or deterring enrolment among those with higher-than-average risk). If insurers are able 
to generate a surplus (at least in the short term) through risk selection, they may not be 
sufficiently motivated to focus on operating efficiently – that is, obtaining most output 
from least input. Risk selection is also undesirable because it may threaten equitable, 
affordable access to health insurance and quality of care (7). Incentives to select risks 
will be stronger if insurers bear financial risk and if the money they have to spend per 
enrolee does not reflect the enrolee’s risk of ill health (36). The degree of risk selection 
that takes place in a given situation may also depend on the extent to which insurers 
have access to selective tools – for example, the ability to link the sale of statutory and 
voluntary health insurance. The primary mechanism for reducing incentives to select 
risks is risk adjustment (also known as risk equalisation). 
 
Financial risk 
Prior to the introduction of insurer competition, insurers in Belgium and the 
Netherlands did not bear any financial risk. They were little more than financial 
conduits, channelling centrally raised resources to providers or raising their own 
revenue but with leeway to increase contribution rates and accumulate deficits. The 
degree of financial risk borne by insurers has increased in all four countries and is 
particularly high in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, but remains low in 
Belgium. Each country has focused on developing a risk-adjustment formula to allocate 
resources to health insurers, although there are differences across countries in the 
design of the formula and in the degree of insurer revenue subject to the formula (Table 
7). 
 
Table 7 here 
 
Risk equalisation 
The extent to which risk equalisation succeeds in lowering incentives to select risks 
largely depends on the sophistication of the formula8, but also on the presence of risk-
sharing arrangements such as ex-post compensation based on actual health care costs 
incurred. Risk sharing lessens the degree of financial risk insurers bear and therefore 
lowers incentives for risk selection, but it also dampens incentives to operate efficiently 
(36). All four countries have strengthened their risk equalisation schemes in the last ten 
years and Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands now have relatively sophisticated 
formulas that include health-based risk adjusters (37-39). 
 
Incentives for risk selection are low in Belgium because of the low level of financial 
risk the sickness funds bear: only 30% of sickness fund revenue is subject to risk 
adjustment and insurers are only financially responsible for 25% of any difference 
                                                 
8 The formula need not be perfect, but it must be sufficiently sophisticated to make risk selection more 
costly to the insurer than it is worth. 
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between allocated revenue and actual health care expenditure. Risk selection does not 
seem to be a policy concern, even though the link between statutory and voluntary 
cover provides insurers with an effective selection tool (13, 14). At the same time as the 
current arrangements limit incentives for risk selection, they are probably not sufficient 
to motivate insurers to operate more efficiently. Insurers in both Germany and the 
Netherlands have incentives to select risks beyond the criteria included in the risk 
adjustment formula. However, German insurers may have less opportunity to do so, 
since the market for complementary VHI is small in Germany (in terms of population 
coverage) compared to VHI markets in Belgium and the Netherlands (31). 
 
Insurers in Switzerland probably face the strongest incentives to select risks because 
they bear full financial risk for outpatient care (although they are much less at risk for 
inpatient costs, which they share with the cantons) (40, 41) and, perhaps more 
importantly, the Swiss risk equalisation scheme was weak for over 20 years, adjusting 
for age and gender only. The need for better risk adjustment was recognised in 
Switzerland for many years, but attempts to improve the formula were blocked or 
slowed down by lobbying on the part of some insurers who were highly influential 
politically (41). In 2012 the Swiss formula was substantially improved by the 
introduction of a new factor, hospitalisation in the previous year; other factors may be 
introduced in the near future (42)9. 
 
The availability and use of tools to enhance efficiency through 
strategic purchasing 
 
The final dimension of interest is the extent to which individual insurers are able to 
influence health care quality and costs – in other words, to engage in strategic 
purchasing. If insurers were not able to do this, the main reasons for encouraging them 
to compete with each other would be to ensure that they provided quality customer 
services, kept administrative costs to a minimum and passed on any cost savings to 
enrolees in the form of lower premiums. These would be satisfactory outcomes, but the 
rationale for insurer competition goes beyond notions of customer service and 
administrative efficiency. At least in theory, it encompasses the notion of enhancing 
efficiency at the level of the health system through stronger purchasing leading to better 
delivery of health care. 
 
The range of tools available 
Table 8 and Table 9 show how insurer-provider relations are regulated and the 
availability and take-up of tools insurers might use to engage in strategic purchasing. 
The tools range from allowing insurers to integrate with providers, which would 
strengthen incentives for expenditure control, to permitting them to selectively contract 
providers, choose how best to reward or penalise good or poor provider performance 
and influence the types of services to which enrolees have access. The list of tools 
included in Table 9 is not exhaustive. 
 
Tables 8-9 here 
 
                                                 
9 Strengthening the risk adjustment formula was the only part of the reform rejected in a 2012 
referendum that had the support of a large majority of the population. 
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In Belgium, Germany and Switzerland collective negotiation between insurers and 
providers is the default method of setting prices and concluding contracts, which limits 
the ability of individual insurers to influence the quality and cost of most health 
services, but preserves free choice of provider for service users (Table 8). In Germany 
and Switzerland insurers have a degree of leeway in the contracting process. Policies 
offering a GP gatekeeping model of care allow German sickness funds to selectively 
contract GPs (in addition to the collective contract) and negotiate prices and other 
conditions on a bilateral basis. The same applies if providers sign integrated-care 
contracts with sickness funds. Similarly, Swiss insurers are allowed to engage in 
selective contracting, negotiate lower prices and use capitation to pay providers when 
people choose managed-care plans (43). However, because collectively negotiated 
prices and contracts are the norm in both countries, insurers need to offer particularly 
attractive terms to convince doctors to sign alternative contracts. Insurers in the 
Netherlands have more freedom in contracting than their counterparts in the other 
countries. Since 2006, selective contracting has been permitted for all forms of care 
and, while the government continues to set maximum prices for GP services and prices 
for one-third of hospital services, the aim is to move towards greater price 
liberalisation. 
 
Take up of purchasing tools 
There are clear differences between Belgium and the other countries in the range of 
tools available to enable strategic purchasing by insurers. The more limited recourse to 
purchasing tools in Belgium reflects the absence of national policy emphasis on 
competition as a mechanism for stronger purchasing and a preference for sickness 
funds to operate collectively. Although this suggests Belgian insurers are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to purchasing, insurers in the other countries do not make 
full use of purchasing tools for a range of reasons including legal restrictions, concerns 
about restricting consumer choice, technical challenges and lack of information. 
 
Legal restrictions preclude widespread take-up of some tools in Germany and 
Switzerland. German sickness funds can only engage in selective contracting or 
develop their own clinical guidelines and prescription drug formularies if funds, GP 
associations and patients opt for gatekeeping contracts or if funds, providers and 
patients opt for integrated-care contracts. A proposal by the federal government in the 
early 2000s to extend selective contracting to elective inpatient treatment was blocked 
by the states on the grounds that it would threaten their ability to plan hospital capacity. 
For Swiss insurers, many purchasing tools are limited to managed-care plans, primarily 
to preserve free choice of provider for those who value it. In 2010 46.9% of enrolees 
opted for a managed-care contract (44), but only a few of these chose the capitation 
model involving selective contracting; most chose a less restrictive family doctor or 
call centre model (45). Recent legislation passed by the Swiss parliament in 2011 
aimed to boost the development of integrated care networks, to strengthen financial 
incentives to enrol in a capitation-based managed care plan (by increasing user charges 
for those who do not enrol from 10 to 15 per cent of care costs) and to ban vertical 
integration of insurers and providers (42), but was rejected in a referendum held in 
2012. 
 
A different form of legal restriction occurs when national authorities block the use of 
permitted tools on the grounds (for example) that they are anti-competitive. In 2009 a 
dominant regional insurer and a group of local health care providers, including GPs, 
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tried to take over a failing Dutch hospital (46). Some members of parliament pressured 
the Minister of Health to prevent the takeover on the grounds that all parties involved 
would have a financial incentive to direct patients toward the hospital in question, 
which would restrict consumer choice. Conversely, residents expressed a desire for 
their local hospital to remain open since closure would also have limited their options 
(46). Something similar can be seen in Germany, where ownership of ambulatory care 
centres by hospitals is disputed. The government had proposed to prohibit this but did 
not introduce the necessary legislation. 
 
Concerns about restricting consumer choice of provider may prevent insurers from 
using selective contracting. In Germany and the Netherlands insurers reveal a strong 
preference for offering enrolees financial incentives (lower user charges or lower 
premiums) to choose preferred provider networks or GP gatekeeping. It is argued that 
Dutch insurers are reluctant to de-select hospitals because they believe consumers will 
regard them as being motivated by financial rather than quality considerations (46, 47). 
Some of these concerns may be justified, since consumers generally reveal a preference 
for wider choice of provider: the GP gatekeeping option has not been as popular among 
patients and sickness funds as expected in Germany (partly because evaluations do not 
show savings); take-up of preferred provider networks in the Netherlands is low; and 
most Swiss enrolees who opt for managed-care plans do not opt for plans involving 
selective contracting (45). Selective contracting has also been resisted by regulators and 
providers. In 2010 a large Dutch insurer published hospital rankings for quality of 
breast cancer care on its website and announced it would no longer send enrolees with 
breast cancer to hospitals that did not reach minimum volume thresholds for breast 
cancer treatment, a move supported by patient groups (48). The Dutch Healthcare 
Inspectorate initially stated that all breast cancer treatment in the Netherlands met its 
standards for responsible care, while the Dutch Association of Surgeons suggested the 
insurer had used inappropriate standards (48). The decision was upheld by the courts, 
however, and other insurers soon followed suit. 
 
Some purchasing tools present technical challenges under certain circumstances, 
particularly selective contracting and price negotiation. As a result, insurers may lack 
the capacity to use them effectively or the transaction costs involved may be high. In 
Germany, selective contracting is unattractive partly due to the complexity of having to 
re-calculate global payments to office-based physicians (Table 8) when some patients 
are treated under separate contracts, and partly because hospitals cannot be de-selected 
on a service-by-service basis (as in the Netherlands). Switzerland has seen mergers 
among private clinics to strengthen provider bargaining power and increase their ability 
to negotiate higher prices with insurers. Since 2006, price negotiation has been 
promoted as a key purchasing tool in the Netherlands, where individual insurers are 
encouraged to negotiate prices with individual hospitals for pre-defined services 
covering 4,000 Diagnostic Treatment Combinations (DTCs, case-based payments per 
episode of illness) equal to 70% of hospital revenue (up from one third of hospital 
revenue in 2010). To help insurers cope with the magnitude of the task, the Dutch 
Insurers’ Association publishes an annual purchasing guide focusing on 200 of the 
most frequently used DTCs (49). 
 
The lack of information on health care quality and costs , particularly at the level of 
individual providers, is a major obstacle to the effective use of some purchasing tools, 
notably selective contracting, price negotiation and performance-based provider 
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payment. Without good information it is not possible to carry out systematic 
benchmarking, which in turn precludes fully informed decision making by insurers and 
enrolees. There is some public disclosure of information about provider performance 
(mainly hospitals) in all four countries and government-led efforts to improve data 
collection and disclosure in Germany (50) and the Netherlands (8). However, public 
disclosure is sometimes controversial (as in the Dutch case) and the lack of informative 
indicators based on reliable data may represent a significant barrier to improved 
purchasing for some time to come. 
 
Policy implications 
 
This paper has reviewed the policy goals underlying the introduction of insurer choice 
and competition for statutory health benefits in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. It has examined policy implementation in three areas: consumer mobility, 
incentives for risk selection, and the availability and use of tools to enhance efficiency. 
In this section we discuss important similarities and differences across the four 
countries, consider the extent to which the conditions underpinning the theoretical 
rationale for insurer competition – to enhance allocative and productive efficiency, 
mainly through stronger purchasing – have been met in practice, and highlight some 
implications for policy. 
 
The range of policy goals underlying insurer choice and competition varies across the 
four countries, but there is common ground. Germany and Switzerland introduced 
reforms primarily to address access and equity concerns. Belgium is the only one of the 
four countries in which public policy has not emphasised competition among insurers. 
It was included in the analysis because the shifting of some financial risk to sickness 
funds in 1995 aimed to stimulate greater expenditure control; after 1995, consumer 
choice of insurer became an integral part of the incentive structure facing sickness 
funds, even though it was not originally intended to have that effect. Expenditure 
control has also been one of the goals of insurer competition in Germany and 
Switzerland. Germany and the Netherlands expected consumer choice of insurer, 
combined with greater financial risk for insurers, to enhance efficiency and quality in 
health care administration and delivery. Efficiency was not explicitly stated as a goal in 
Switzerland, but it has been used in public debate to justify maintaining the status quo – 
in other words, alternatives to insurer competition are portrayed as being likely to lower 
efficiency. 
 
Risk adjustment has been a priority for policy makers – for good reason, since risk 
selection erodes insurers’ incentives to operate efficiently and may threaten equity and 
quality of care. However, while all four countries have introduced and improved risk 
adjustment formulas, there is variation across countries in the quality of the formula 
and in the pace at which it has been strengthened. Policy makers in Germany accepted 
that their original formula was relatively crude because they lacked the necessary 
information for a more effective formula; once they had the information, however, they 
were able to refine the formula. The weakness of Switzerland’s formula was widely 
acknowledged nationally, but action to strengthen it was blocked for many years by 
industry lobbying rather than by lack of data. In spite of the energy devoted to 
strengthening formulas, no country has fully eliminated incentives to select risks (38). 
Circumstantial evidence for all of the countries indicates there is risk selection through 
targeted advertising, through the use of reminders and discounts and through product 
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differentiation in VHI10 (8, 20, 38, 51), while anecdotal evidence suggests insurers in 
some countries have tried to deter high risks from enrolling11. Further strengthening of 
the formula continues to be a priority for Switzerland, but there is scope for 
improvement in the other countries too. 
 
Consumer mobility has not received as much attention as risk adjustment. Extensive 
regulation to facilitate mobility (much of it predating the introduction of insurer 
competition) may mean that switching costs are negligible for most people in all four 
countries. However, a small but growing body of evidence suggests consumer mobility 
is limited among older and less healthy individuals – those likely to use health services 
on a regular basis. This ought to be a cause for concern, because if insurers feel these 
enrolees are unlikely to switch, they may not have sufficient incentive to provide them 
with high-quality care. 
 
Research identifies two potential barriers to consumer mobility: first, increasingly close 
links between the sale of statutory health insurance and complementary or 
supplementary VHI and second, choice overload. Tied sales of statutory and voluntary 
health insurance are prohibited in the Netherlands and Switzerland, but insurers have 
found ways of linking the two types of cover. While a mixture of regulation, risk 
adjustment and accepted norms seems to have prevented most insurers from using VHI 
to select risks for statutory health insurance, it has not allayed consumer fears about 
obtaining adequate voluntary cover when switching to a new insurer for statutory 
cover. This is a particular problem in the Netherlands and Switzerland, where VHI 
coverage is widespread. The Belgian solution – greater regulation of VHI12 – may not 
be attractive to policy makers elsewhere, in part due to concerns about infringing EU 
internal market rules (52). Nevertheless, the importance of VHI as an obstacle to 
consumer mobility among older and less healthy people requires some form of policy 
action. Better risk adjustment might help, alongside better information for consumers 
and closer scrutiny of the sales process. Policy attention should also focus on the 
potential for choice overload, particularly in the context of a trend towards allowing 
insurers to offer differentiated benefits to suit individual preferences – for example, 
different levels of user charges or additional services. It is well established that product 
differentiation, even at the margin, lowers transparency (35). This in turn increases 
transaction costs for consumers and can therefore undermine competition. 
 
Making sure insurers have and use tools to influence health care quality and costs is 
essential if competition is to enhance efficiency through stronger purchasing. Individual 
insurers in Belgium do not have these tools, insurers in Germany and Switzerland have 
access to some tools, and insurers in the Netherlands have access to a wider range of 
                                                 
10 Swiss insurers use holding companies to direct enrolees to a plan with an ‘appropriate’ premium, while 
in the Netherlands the growth of group contracts has allowed insurers to offer discounts to some groups 
(employers, self-employed people, sports clubs) but not others (patient associations) (33). 
11 In 2011 several hundred members of an insolvent sickness fund in Germany were put off joining other 
sickness funds through statements such as “we cannot guarantee that your insurance card will be ready in 
time” etc; the Federal Insurance Authority had to intervene and reminded the sickness funds to obey 
legal requirements. 
12 In Belgium open enrolment is guaranteed for compulsory additional benefits. In 2007 legislation 
extended open enrolment requirements to the sale of VHI and prohibited premium differentiation based 
on pre-existing medical conditions (except for people aged 65 years and above who did not already hold 
a similar policy with their former insurer). 
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tools but do not always use them. Differences in policy goals across countries – the 
lack of policy emphasis on competition in Belgium and the policy emphasis on access 
and equity goals in Germany and Switzerland – may explain some of this variation; but 
the experience of the four countries under review suggests that differences may arise 
for other reasons, including lack of relevant data and stakeholder resistance to the use 
of some tools. 
 
In all four countries commentators have emphasised the need for better information 
about health care quality and costs. The importance of good information cannot be 
overstated, particularly in facilitating selective contracting, setting appropriate prices, 
developing priorities, fostering best practice and linking provider payment to 
performance. However, good information is not the only pre-requisite for strategic 
purchasing. Policy also needs to ensure that insurers have incentives to operate 
efficiently, that there is sufficient capacity to make use of tools, and that incentives are 
aligned across the health system. 
 
Resistance seems inevitable given that some purchasing tools have the potential to 
restrict enrolee choice (of both insurer and provider, in the case of selective 
contracting), many of them will affect provider autonomy and income, and most 
require information that is not readily available. Cross-country variation may therefore 
reflect differences in the extent to which policy makers and insurers are willing and 
able to curb enrolee choice and challenge providers. This in turn may reflect 
uncertainty on the part of policy makers about the appropriate place for competition – 
among insurers or among providers? – and about who is best placed to influence 
provider behaviour – government, insurers collectively, individual insurers or health 
care users? 
 
Conclusions 
 
Reforms introducing insurer choice and competition have had diverse goals in 
European health systems. They have not always aimed to enhance efficiency, but where 
they have, expectations about efficiency gains may conflict with other stated goals such 
as expenditure control. Reforms have also been implemented in different ways and in 
different timeframes. Differences in policy goals explain some but not all of the 
differences in policy design and development across countries. Not surprisingly, 
political factors have an explanatory role. 
 
Each country has put in place some measures to meet the three conditions highlighted 
in this paper as being necessary for insurer competition to enhance efficiency, including 
extensive regulation to secure consumer mobility, reduce incentives for risk selection 
and provide insurers with tools for strategic purchasing. However, there are important 
variations in the implementation of these measures. The pace with which risk 
adjustment has been strengthened has been much slower in Switzerland than in the 
other countries and, in spite of significant investment in risk adjustment, incentives for 
risk selection remain in all four countries. Consumer mobility is not equally distributed 
across the population in three out of the four countries for which data are available. 
Better risk adjustment may enhance mobility among older and less healthy people, but 
policy makers need to pay more attention to the way in which insurers link the sale of 
statutory and voluntary health insurance, particularly in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. In Belgium, Germany and Switzerland collective negotiation between 
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insurers and providers curbs the ability of individual insurers to influence the quality 
and costs of many health services. Insurers in the Netherlands have good access to 
efficiency-enhancing tools; nevertheless, data and capacity constraints and resistance 
from enrolees, providers, regulators and politicians limit the extent to which tools are 
used. 
 
The experience of the four countries reviewed in this paper offers an important lesson 
to countries thinking of introducing competition in statutory health insurance: it is not 
straightforward to put in place the conditions under which health insurance competition 
can enhance efficiency. Policy makers should not, therefore, underestimate the 
challenges involved. Effective risk adjustment requires extensive data and may be 
obstructed by insurers. Consumer mobility rests on substantial regulation and may be 
threatened where the same insurers sell statutory and voluntary benefits, the take up of 
VHI is significant and there is reluctance to regulate the VHI market. Finally, the 
availability and use of tools to enhance efficiency may be opposed by a range of 
stakeholders. 
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Table 1 Health insurance coverage, 2011 
 
Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Statutory coverage 
breadth (universality) 
Coverage compulsory for all residents 
since 2008 (salaried workers: 1944; 
inpatient care for self employed: 1964; 
outpatient care for self employed: 2008). 
Coverage compulsory under SHI since 
2007; coverage compulsory for all 
residents since 2009. Around 85% 
covered by SHI, 10% through PHI, 4% 
through other government schemes. 
Coverage compulsory for all legal 
residents since 2006. 
Coverage compulsory for all residents since 
1996. 
What % of the population 
is not covered? 
Less than 1.0% of the population (a high 
of 1.4% in 2007). 
Probably less than 0.5% of the population 
(in 2007, before the introduction of 
compulsory insurance). 
About 0.2% of the population in 2012 
(plus a further 1.0% who are illegally 
resident) (53). 
About 1.9% in 2010. New regulations 
introduced in 2012 should have significantly 
reduced this percentage (but no official data 
available yet). 
What are the 
characteristics of the 
uninsured? 
Not known (a mixture of people unable 
and unwilling to pay health insurance 
premiums). 
Before 2007/09: Self employed, formerly 
voluntary SHI members, people aged 55+ 
no longer eligible for SHI, divorced 
women formerly covered as dependants 
and illegal immigrants. 
Low-income individuals, both legal 
and illegal immigrants (illegal 
immigrants are not allowed to 
purchase subsidised health insurance). 
Not known (there was a big debate about 
whether the uninsured were unable or 
unwilling to pay health insurance premiums). 
More likely to be aged 20-59, foreigners, 
divorced or single, below or just above the 
threshold for social assistance, users of mental 
health services (54). 
What is the main role of 
voluntary health 
insurance? 
Supplementary (mainly for superior 
accommodation in a hospital, not to 
increase choice or for faster access) and 
complementary covering eye and dental 
care. 
 
Substitutive, covering civil servants, self-
employed and high-earning employees 
who choose private insurance (in total, 
around 10% of the population); 
complementary, covering user charges 
and some uncovered services (around 
20% of the population). 
Complementary, offering mainly 
dental care and physiotherapy benefits 
(about 90% of the population). 
Supplementary cover (offering free choice of 
hospital across all cantons, free choice of 
physician in public hospitals, higher standards 
of hotel comfort in private and semi-private 
wards, daily cash benefits) and 
complementary cover of excluded or partially 
covered services (eg dental care and home 
care). In 2005 59% of the population had 
hospital cover, 37% had cash benefit cover, 
11% had dental cover and 52% had cover for 
other excluded services (55). 
Coverage scope (benefits) Broad coverage. Broad coverage. Broad coverage. Broad coverage. 
What health services are 
typically not covered? 
Eyeglasses and contact lenses, hearing 
aids, orthodontic care, cosmetic plastic 
surgery, less necessary drugs (eg over-
the-counter drugs and some prescribed 
drugs such as benzodiazepines) and 
alternative medicine. 
Eyeglasses, contact lenses and over-the-
counter and ‘lifestyle’ drugs. 
Eyeglasses and contact lenses, dental 
care for adults, orthodontic care, 
cosmetic plastic surgery and 
alternative medicine. 
For eyeglasses and contact lenses only a lump 
sum is paid. Inpatient care provided at a 
hospital not on a specific cantonal list, 
psychotherapy (covered subject to certain 
conditions), drugs not listed in the ‘catalogue 
of pharmaceutical specialities’, alternative 
medicine, dental care, and cosmetic plastic 
surgery. 
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 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who defines the statutory 
benefits package? 
Federal government based on proposals 
negotiated between sickness funds and 
providers. The Minster of Social Affairs 
defines entitlement to drugs based on 
advice from the Drug Reimbursement 
Committee.  
In general terms, federal 
legislature/parliament; details by Federal 
Joint Committee representing payers, 
providers and patients. 
Central government based on advice 
from the independent Dutch Health 
Care Insurance Board (CVZ). 
Central government based on advice from the 
Federal Commission on Health Insurance 
Benefits and General Questions representing 
payers, providers, patients and scientific 
advisors. 
Coverage depth (user 
charges) 
Co-insurance or co-payments applied to 
most health services, with an annual out-
of-pocket maximum. 
Co-payments for adults applied to most 
health services, with an annual out-of-
pocket maximum. 
Annual deductible of €220 (in 2012) 
per adult (18+) applied for non-
primary care services. 
Minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 
(€248) plus co-insurance or co-payments 
applied to most health services, with an annual 
out-of-pocket maximum. The maximum 
optional deductible for adults is CHF 2500 
(€2068).  
Who defines user charges 
policy? 
Federal legislation.  Federal legislature/parliament. Sickness 
funds can waive some charges (eg for 
enrolment in DMPs). 
Central government. Insurers can 
waive or increase some charges for use 
of preferred/non-preferred providers. 
The insured can choose to pay a higher 
annual deductible. 
Central government. Insurers may waive or 
increase some charges. The insured can 
choose to pay a higher annual deductible. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: Currency converted using 1 October 2012 exchange rates from www.oanda.com. DMP = disease management programme; PHI = private health insurance; SHI = statutory health 
insurance 
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Table 2 Regulation of statutory health insurance, 2012 
 
Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who sets and collects 
contributions? 
Federal government sets and collects 
a uniform income-related 
contribution. Sickness funds set and 
collect additional community-rated 
premiums. 
Since 2011 a national contribution 
rate has been defined in legislation. 
In 2009/10 the federal government 
(the cabinet) set a uniform income-
related contribution rate. Prior to 
this the sickness funds determined 
their own contribution rate. 
Contributions are collected by 
sickness funds but transferred to a 
central health fund. Sickness funds 
set and collect additional 
community-rated premiums. 
Central government sets and collects a uniform 
income-related contribution. Insurers set and 
collect additional community-rated premiums. 
 
Insurers set and collect their own 
community-rated premiums. 
How are statutory health 
insurance revenues pooled 
and (re)allocated? 
Income-related contributions and 
general tax revenue pooled by a 
central fund and allocated to 
sickness funds based on a risk-
adjusted formula and actual costs. 
Income-related contributions and 
general tax revenue pooled by a 
central fund (see note) and 
allocated to sickness funds based 
on a risk-adjusted formula. 
Income-related contributions and general tax 
revenue to cover children pooled by a central fund 
and allocated to insurers based on a risk-adjusted 
formula. 
Premiums pooled by insurers and 
redistributed at cantonal level based on a 
risk-adjusted formula managed by a 
foundation owned by the insurers. General 
tax revenue is pooled by Cantons and used 
to pay for about half of all inpatient care 
costs. 
Who sets the formula for 
(re)allocating resources? 
Federal government. Parliament defines the principles in 
law. The Federal Ministry of 
Health defines the details through 
ordinance. 
Central government. Parliament defines the principles on which 
risk adjustment should be based. The 
Federal Council is responsible for applying 
them in setting the formula. 
Who monitors insurer 
competition? 
A government agency (Control 
Office of the Sickness Funds) and 
the Belgian Central Bank (NBB). 
SHI: the Federal Insurance 
Authority; PHI: the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority 
Semi-public supervisory authorities at arm’s 
length: the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) 
manages competition among the providers and 
insurers; the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) 
covers all sectors (monitoring the health sector now 
accounts for about one third of its time); the Dutch 
Central Bank (DNB) supervises financial solvency. 
Under the FHIA, the Federal Office of 
Public Health controls SHI activity; VHI 
activity falling under the private Law on 
Insurance Contracts (VVG) is supervised by 
FINMA, the Swiss Financial Markets 
Supervisory Authority, which replaced the 
Federal Office of Private Insurance in 2009. 
The government has recently proposed a 
new law to strengthen control and 
regulation of health insurers (56). 
 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: Farmers’ sickness funds in Germany do not participate in the central fund and are not subject to the risk equalisation scheme. PHI = private health insurance; SHI = statutory 
health insurance; VHI = voluntary health insurance. 
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Table 3 Market structure of statutory health insurance, 2012 
 
Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
What is the legal/profit status of insurers? Sickness funds are non-governmental non-
profit organisations under public law. The 
market is closed to new entrants. 
Sickness funds are non-governmental, non-
profit organisations under public law. 
Insurers are private entities 
allowed to share profits with 
their shareholders. 
Insurers are private entities 
and cannot share profits on 
SHI business. 
If profit status varies, what is the balance 
between non-profit and for-profit? 
Not relevant. Not relevant. Most insurers are non-profit 
mutual associations. 
About 60% have non-profit 
legal status (foundations or 
associations) and 40% are 
stock companies owned by 
non-profit institutions. 
If profits are allowed, are there any 
controls on profit margins? 
Not relevant. No.  No. Profits not allowed for SHI 
business (see note). 
How many insurers are there? Five sickness fund associations (divided 
into 54 local funds), a public insurer of last 
resort and a scheme for railroad workers. 
146 sickness funds. 11 health insurance holding 
companies in 2010, 28 different 
health insurers in total. The 
largest holding company 
contains 7 insurers. 
68 insurers involved in SHI in 
2012 (8 of which only offer 
voluntary daily cash 
insurance). 
What is the market share of the largest 
three insurers? 
About 90%. About 32%. 74% for holding companies. Nationally: 45% (holdings); 
28% (individual insurers). 
Cantonal markets are much 
more concentrated. 
Can insurers who sell SHI also sell 
voluntary cover? 
Yes, but in 2010 local sickness fund 
compulsory health insurance activity was 
separated from VHI activity. From 2012 the 
latter will be offered by non-profit societies 
of mutual assistance (part of the national 
sickness fund associations). 
Sickness funds can broker VHI sold by 
private insurers; in practice the line is 
becoming blurred as SHI policies for 
‘integrated care’ include some 
supplementary benefits (eg smaller wards in 
hospital). 
Yes. The Dutch Health 
Insurance Act prohibits the 
termination of VHI contracts 
when enrolees switch to another 
insurer for SHI cover. 
Yes. Legislation prohibits tied 
sales of VHI and SHI. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: In Germany PHI falls under private law. Of the 43 private insurers, 19 are non-profit and 24 are for-profit (2011) and the market share of the largest three insurers is around 
42%.A survey of 65 Swiss funds found that only one had distributed part of its VHI profits to the holding company. This suggests profits on VHI business are generally kept within 
companies to increase reserves, reduce premiums or invest in marketing campaigns (57). PHI = private health insurance; SHI = statutory health insurance; VHI = voluntary health 
insurance.
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Table 4 Switching rates among enrolees for statutory benefits and characteristics of switchers 
Country Switching rates Characteristics of switchers 
Belgium Early 2000s: around 1% (14). No data available. 
Germany 1997-2007: varied from 4.0% to 5.8% 
(58). 
1995-2001: switchers more likely to be younger and 
healthier (25, 28, 59, 60); 2010: switchers more likely to 
be younger, higher income, better educated and not 
chronically ill (61). 
Netherlands Before 2000: around 1% (62); 2005: 
around 3% (8); 2006: 18%; 2007: 4.4%; 
2008: 3.6%; 2009: 3.5% (26); 2010: 5.5% 
(63); 6.0% in 2011 (64). 
Prior to 2006: switchers more likely to be younger and 
better educated (25, 65); 2006-2009: switchers have better 
self-reported health (26). 
Switzerland Switching rates fell from 4.8% in 1997 to 
2.1% in 2000 (23) and rose from 12% in 
2008/9 to 15.4% in 2009/10 (25% among 
those choosing the largest annual 
deductible) (66). 
1996-2005: switching more likely among people choosing 
higher deductibles, less likely with age and less likely 
among people with VHI whose self-reported health is 
‘poor’ or ‘good’ (as opposed to ‘very good’) (20); 2000: 
switching less likely among people with VHI (23). 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: VHI = voluntary health insurance. 
 
 
Table 5 Price and quality differences between insurers  
Country Is price a reason for switching? Is quality a reason for switching? 
Belgium No. Price differences are negligible. In 2010 
additional community-rated premiums did not exceed 
€20 per enrolee per year. Price elasticity <1 (62). 
Yes. People switch to be with the same insurer 
as a partner, for better customer service or to 
obtain a different set of VHI benefits (the main 
reason). 
Germany Yes. In the late 1990s substantial differences in 
contribution rates across insurers and the role of 
employers in financing coverage led to high price 
elasticity (60, 62). Since 2009, with the introduction 
of the nationally uniform contribution rate, price 
signals have generally been weak, but people are 
very sensitive to price where signals exist. 
Yes. The reasons given for switching include 
better benefits, better service, better image and 
change of employer or industry (59). In 2010 
additional care offers were also mentioned (61). 
Netherlands Yes. Negligible price differences before 2006. Since 
2006 insurers differentiate themselves through 
premium discounts for higher deductibles or group 
coverage. 
Yes. Little product differentiation before 2006. 
Greater differentiation since 2006 in terms of 
the range of prescription drugs reimbursed 
within a given therapeutic category, modes of 
customer service and VHI products. 
Switzerland Yes. Substantial variation in premiums; insurers 
differentiate themselves through discounts for 
children under 18, students aged 19-25, enrolees who 
opt for higher deductibles (up to 70% of difference 
between the minimum and the chosen deductible) or 
managed-care contracts (up to 20%). 
Yes. People can opt for managed-care contracts 
involving gatekeeping and preferred provider 
networks. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: VHI = voluntary health insurance. 
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Table 6 Choice for users, 2012 
Choice regarding: Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Insurance status (to 
be insured or not) 
No. No. No. No. 
Insurers Yes. After 12 months 
of enrolment, people 
can switch quarterly. 
Yes. People can switch 
after 18 months or within 2 
months if the insurer 
introduces or raises a 
community-rated 
premium. 
Yes. People can 
switch once a 
year. 
Yes. People can switch 
twice a year giving 
three months’ notice. 
Level of pre-paid 
contribution 
Yes, for community-
rated premiums, but 
the amounts are 
negligible. 
Yes, for the community-
rated premium (but this is 
currently very small). 
Yes, for 
community-
rated premiums. 
Yes. 
Range of benefits No. No, except for a very few 
benefits defined by 
individual sickness funds. 
No. No. 
Benefit modality 
(cash vs in kind) 
No. Yes Yes. No. 
Extent of user 
charges 
Only in conjunction 
with other conditions 
(eg use of generic 
drugs, use of regular 
GP, gatekeeping). 
Same for all sickness 
funds. 
Only in conjunction with 
other conditions (eg 
gatekeeping, enrolment in 
DMP). Varies by sickness 
fund. 
Yes. Yes. 
Providers Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: GP = general practitioner; DMP = disease management programme. 
 
Table 7 Strength of insurer incentives to select risks, 2012 
 Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Prospective resource 
allocation subject to risk 
equalisation (%) 
30% 100% 100% 100% 
Risk equalisation scheme Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. 
Risk adjustment includes 
health-based criteria 
Yes. Yes. Yes. Partially (hospitalisation of at least 3 
days in the previous year); plans to 
include additional health-based criteria. 
Risk sharing Insurers pay 25% 
of any revenue-
expenditure gap. 
No. No. No (see note). 
Incentive to select risks Low. High. High. Very high. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: Swiss insurers bear full financial risk for outpatient care, but the costs of inpatient care are shared between insurers 
and cantons. 
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Table 8 Regulation of insurer-provider relations, 2012 
 
Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Who regulates 
purchaser-provider 
relations? 
Basic framework established through 
federal legislature. Organised at the 
federal level through collective 
negotiation between provider and 
sickness fund representatives. 
Basic framework established through federal 
legislature. Details negotiated among corporatist 
actors at the federal level with federal Ministry 
of Health oversight, and at state level with state 
ministries responsible for health. 
The Dutch Healthcare Authority and 
the Dutch Competition Authority. 
National legislation (FHIA) defines general 
rules. Hospital sector strongly regulated and 
planned by the 26 cantonal authorities. 
Outpatient care regulated through the TARMED 
tariff scheme. In 2002 the Federal Council 
decreed a moratorium on the opening of new 
medical practices (delegating this to the cantons), 
which was extended to end 2009 for GPs and 
end 2011 for specialists. 
Describe the main 
characteristics of 
purchaser-provider 
relations 
Fee schedule determined through 
collective negotiation among sickness 
funds / provider groups. Agreements 
negotiated for two years. Increasingly, 
physicians opt out of the agreements 
(13% of GPs, 20% of specialists, with 
large differences among specialists). 
Selective contracting not allowed. 
Social law stipulates the areas in which decisions 
must be made by joint committees of sickness 
funds and providers (eg SHI benefits and the 
relative point value scale for SHI-accredited 
physicians), and those in which decisions can be 
reached through direct negotiations (total level of 
remuneration for ambulatory care and contracts 
between funds and providers). 
Free pricing for physiotherapy since 
2005 and for selected inpatient 
services. Selective contracting and 
vertical integration allowed since 
2006. Insurers and providers are free 
to choose tools for managing care. 
Insurers must reimburse all medical services 
prescribed by physicians and contract all 
hospitals included in cantonal planning and any 
physician permitted to practise, giving patients 
the right to visit any outpatient physician without 
registration or referral. Selective contracting and 
capitation payment are allowed for patients 
opting for managed-care plans. 
Are there caps on 
insurer 
administrative costs? 
Yes. The cap is determined annually 
by federal law (programme law). 
Yes (since 2004). The cap used to apply to 
administrative costs as a percentage of 
expenditure; for 2011 capped at the 2010 level.  
No. No. 
Who determines how 
providers are paid? 
All payment mechanisms are set out in 
federal legislation. 
Federal legislation increasingly sets out payment 
mechanisms, but details are decided by 
corporatist actors. 
A combination of government and 
free price negotiation between 
insurers and providers. 
National legislation (FHIA) sets out general rules 
for provider payment. 
Who sets health 
service prices? 
Collective negotiation between 
provider/sickness fund representatives, 
approved by Minister of Social Affairs. 
Maximum price of pharmaceuticals set 
by Minister of Economic Affairs based 
on advice from a commission of trade 
unions, pharmacists, sickness funds, 
pharmaceutical industry, government. 
Ambulatory care: federal and state corporatist 
institutions (sickness funds and Federal 
Association of SHI Physicians) 
DRGs: federal corporatist institutions (sickness 
funds and German Hospital Federation) and 
federal government if no agreement. 
Pharmaceutical reference prices: corporatist 
institutions at federal level, but manufacturers 
generally free to determine prices.  
Government price setting and free 
price negotiation between insurers 
and providers. The prices of one-
third of all hospital products (which 
include doctors’ fees) are set by the 
government, and the government 
sets maximum prices for most GP 
services. 
Mainly collective negotiation between insurer 
and provider representatives approved by 
government. Cantonal authorities set prices if 
agreement cannot be reached. Pharmaceutical 
and laboratory prices set by the federal 
government. 
Changes in any of the 
above 
No. Since 2011 pharmaceuticals demonstrating 
clinical added value and those that cannot be 
included in the reference pricing system have 
been subject to price negotiations between 
manufacturers/sickness funds a year after launch. 
Insurers and providers have more 
freedom to negotiate prices. This 
trend is expected to continue. 
No. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: GP = general practitioner; SHI = statutory health insurance 
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Table 9 Availability and take-up of purchasing tools by insurers offering statutory benefits, 2012 
Tools Belgium Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Vertical insurer-
provider integration 
Yes; take-up very low.. No, with rare historical exceptions; otherwise 
only permitted for rehabilitation. 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
Yes, but take-up low; an attempt to ban vertical integration of 
insurer and providers was rejected by popular ballot, along 
with a proposal for integrated care networks, in 2012. 
Selective contracting No. Yes, but only in the context of integrated care 
contracts, therefore low take-up. 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing strongly. 
Yes, but only for enrolees opting for managed-care contracts 
(46% of the population in 2010); however, only part of these 
contracts are genuinely based on selective contracting. 
Financial incentives for 
patients to use 
preferred providers 
No. Yes; moderate take-up (GP contracts less 
popular than expected). 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing strongly. 
A 15% co-insurance rate for ordinary coverage and a 10% 
rate for plans with preferred providers and integrated care 
networks was approved by parliament but cancelled 
following the referendum held in June 2012. 
Clinical guidelines / 
protocols 
Yes, collectively. Yes, possible within GP contracts and integrated 
care contracts; low take-up. 
Yes; moderate to high take-
up. 
Not explicitly. It is up to the physicians to use these tools to 
deal with eg capitation payment within managed-care 
contracts. 
Formularies for 
medicines 
Yes, collectively. Yes, possible within GP contracts and integrated 
care contracts; low take-up. 
Yes; moderate take-up. No. Pharmaceuticals included in the benefits package cannot 
be restricted through managed-care arrangements.  
Incentives for rational 
prescribing / dispensing 
of medicines 
Yes, collectively. Directed at physicians: prescription limits; 
directed towards pharmacists: generic 
substitution unless ruled out; directed at patients: 
lower co-payments for drugs priced at least 30% 
below reference price. 
Financial incentives to 
pharmacists to encourage 
generic substitution. 
A higher co-insurance rate (20% rather than 10%) for brand 
drugs if a generic alternative is available. 
Disease management 
programmes 
Yes, collectively. Yes; high take-up (about 9% of SHI enrolees in 
2011). 
Yes; take-up low but 
growing. 
Not explicitly.  
Utilisation review Yes, collectively, but only for 
very expensive services. 
Yes, collectively and routinely; individually only 
in integrated care contracts, low take up. 
Yes; moderate take-up. Yes, within managed-care arrangements. 
Waiting list 
management 
Not relevant. Not relevant. Yes; high take-up and 
successful. 
Not relevant. 
Price negotiation No. Yes, partial (eg GP-based gatekeeping or 
integrated care contracts); currently mainly with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, high take up 
(about 60% of drugs distributed under rebate 
contracts). 
Yes, partial; high take-up.  Yes, but only for enrolees opting for managed-care contracts. 
Performance-based 
payment of providers 
No Yes, but used only within integrated care 
contracts; low take up. 
Yes, partial; take-up 
growing. 
Yes, within managed-care arrangements. 
Public disclosure of 
performance indicators 
Yes, collectively, mainly for 
supplementary hospital costs 
Yes; mandatory for certain hospital indicators 
(but not very relevant for purchasing). 
Yes; moderate take-up but 
growing. 
Yes, in the hospital sector; modest results. 
Source: Authors’ research 
Note: GP = general practitioner; SHI = statutory health insurance. 
